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Many countries in the MENA region have established 
partial credit guarantee schemes to facilitate SME access 
to finance. These schemes can play an important role, 
especially in a period where MENA governments are 
making efforts to improve the effectiveness of credit 
registries and bureaus and strengthen creditor rights. 
This paper reviews the design of partial credit guarantee 
schemes in MENA, and assesses their preliminary 
outcomes. The paper is based on a survey conducted in 
10 MENA countries in early 2010. The authors find 
that the average size of guarantee schemes in MENA 
(measured by the total value of outstanding guarantees) 
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is in line with the international average, although there 
are wide differences across countries, and some schemes 
seem too small to make any significant impact. Most 
importantly, the number of guarantees looks generally 
small while their average value looks large. This suggests 
that guarantee schemes are not yet reaching the smaller 
firms. Guarantee schemes in MENA look financially 
sound and most schemes have room to grow. However, 
this growth should be accompanied by an improvement 
of some key design and management features, as well as 
the introduction of systematic impact evaluation reviews. 
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1  Introduction 
Expanding SME access to finance has proved a challenge in many developing countries, 
especially in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.  Research shows that 
SMEs contribute to a large share of employment and GDP in developing economies.
2 Despite 
their importance, SMEs are significantly more financially constrained than large firms, 
especially in developing countries.  This problem seems severe in MENA countries, where 
about 33% of SMEs report difficulties in getting finance, compared to 25% on average in 
other emerging countries
3. The lack of  SME access to finance is  to a large extent   the 
consequence  of  weaknesses  in  the  enabling  environment  for  finance  (e.g.  weak  credit 
reporting systems, collateral regimes) that result in informational asymmetries and high risks 
to creditors
4.   
 
Deficiencies  in  the  enabling  environment  have  motivated  government  interventions 
designed to expand SME finance.  Government interventions may be justified when it takes 
time to build an effective enabling environment, or where some groups remain difficult to 
reach, even when efficient financial infrastructure and regulations are in place.  Traditionally, 
such  policy  interventions  have  included  partial  credit  guarantee  schemes,  direct  lending 
facilities, and lending by state-owned financial institutions.  
 
Partial Credit Guarantee Schemes (PCGs) are operated by a large number of countries 
and are considered one of the most market-friendly types of interventions.  In developed 
countries  such  schemes  have  been  operational  for  over  four  decades  while  their  use  in 
developing countries is more recent. PCGs facilitate access to finance by creditworthy firms 
when such access is constrained by insufficient credit information and collateral. As a risk-
sharing mechanism, PCGs reduce the risks and potential losses of creditors, inducing lending 
to riskier types of borrowers. Arguably, PCGs generate fewer market distortions compared to 
other policy interventions, such as directed lending programs or state banks, because they 
usually entail less interference in credit allocation and use private banks as the main vehicles 
for loan origination. 
 
Many countries have also used PCGs as a countercyclical policy tool. Korea is one of the 
most notable examples of a country that have used credit guarantees during crises to alleviate 
the adverse effects on SMEs
5. As another example, in the current global crisis the European 
Union has allowed PCGs in member states to increase the coverage ratio to 90 percent for 
distressed  SMEs  until  end -2010,  and  allowed  the  possibility  for  subsidized  guarantee 
premiums. In addition, some guarantee schemes introduced simplified and faster approval 
processes (e.g. Portugal, Romania, Greece) or raised the maximum  guaranteed loan amount 
(e.g. Germany).  
 
Many countries in the MENA region have established PCGs to facilitate SME access to 
finance.  These schemes can play an important role, especially in a period where MENA 
governments are making efforts to improve the effectiveness of credit registries and bureaus 
                                                           
2 Ayyagari et al., (2003) .  
3 See www.entreprisesurveys.org 
4 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Peria (2009) show that differences in the quality of the legal framework explain the 
differences in SME lending between developed and developing countries.  Rocha, Farazi, Khouri, and Pearce 
(2010) provide similar evidence for MENA.  A review of SME finance is provided in World Bank (2008) and 
IFC (2010)  
5 IFC (2010). 5 
 
and strengthen creditor rights.  There is some evidence that credit guarantee schemes have 
contributed to more SME lending in the region – the MENA countries that have larger and 
more established PCGs have larger shares of SME lending and this result seems to hold when 
controlling for other factors.
6 The central policy question, however, is whether these schemes 
are cost-effective, i.e., whether they are able to target financially constrained SMEs, reach a 
significant number of these firms, and remain financially sustainable.  
 
The objective of this paper is to review the design of PCGs in MENA and assess their 
preliminary outcomes.  A survey was conducted in 10 MENA countries in early 2010 to 
gather  the  information  needed  for  the  assessment.    In  each  country,  the  largest  credit 
guarantee  scheme  was  surveyed.  The  survey  covered  the  main  rules  of  the  scheme,  the 
management of the scheme, and the key outcome indicators.  The survey results allow for a 
review  of  these  schemes  based  on  comparisons  with  other  mature  schemes  outside  the 
MENA region.   
 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.    The  next  section  provides  a  brief  survey  of  the 
literature on PCGs.  The third section describes the MENA survey and the methodology 
adopted for reviewing PCGs.  The fourth section reviews the rules of PCGs in MENA, while 
the fifth section provides a preliminary analysis of their outcomes.  Finally, the sixth section 
concludes and identifies the main elements of the agenda for improving the effectiveness of 
PCGs in MENA. 
2  A Brief Survey of the Literature 
There is a growing body of literature on partial credit guarantee schemes, reflecting the 
increasing interest on this type of policy intervention to support SME access to finance. 
This literature can be classified into three broad areas. The first consists of cross-country 
surveys describing the main features of guarantee schemes (e.g. Beck and al. (2008), Bennett 
and al. (2005)). The second consists of individual country studies, including efforts to assess 
additionality (e.g. Ridding (2007), Cowan and al. (2009)). Finally, a third category focuses on 
best practices and design issues, drawing on the international experience (e.g. Deelen and 
Molenaar (2004), Green (2003)).    
The World Bank conducted the first large scale cross-country survey of PCGs in 2008 
(Beck,  Klapper,  and  Mendoza,  2008).  The  objective  of  this  survey  was  to  provide  an 
overview  of  the  key  features  of  guarantee  schemes  around  the  world,  such  as  eligibility 
criteria,  coverage  ratios,  fees,  and  selected  indicators  of  operational  and  financial 
performance. The sample comprised 76 guarantee schemes operating in 46 developed and 
developing countries (However, Egypt was the only MENA country included).  The survey 
shows that there are large differences in the organizational features and rules of guarantee 
schemes around the world. Interestingly, these differences are not systematically related to 
financial and economic development. One of the many interesting findings of the survey is 
that few  guarantee schemes around the world use risk-based pricing or risk-management 
mechanisms. The authors call for further empirical research on specific schemes to better 
understand which features work best in practice. They also stress the importance of doing 
proper cost-benefit analysis to assess whether guarantee schemes are cost-effective.        
                                                           
6 Rocha, Farazi, Khouri, and Pearce (2010). 6 
 
Some country studies have concluded that PCGs have contributed positively to SME 
access to finance.  Although measuring the impact of PCGs accurately remains technically 
challenging (Section 5), some recent studies have concluded that PCGs have been able to 
extend finance to firms that otherwise would have remained constrained.  For example, in 
Canada Ridding (2007) estimates that 75% of guarantees are used by firms that would not 
have been able to obtain a loan otherwise. In Chile, Larrain and Quiroz (2006) find that the 
guarantee scheme increases the probability of small firms to get a loan by 14%. At the same 
time, PCG schemes may add limited value and prove costly when they are not well designed. 
As  noted  by  Honohan  (2008),  loose  eligibility  criteria,  low  fees,  and  overly  generous 
coverage  ratios  may  result  in  the  provision  of guarantees  to  enterprises  that  would  have 
obtained credit anyway.  They may also result in financial imbalances requiring recurrent 
government contributions. Along these lines, Bechri et al. (2001) studied the case of the 
Tunisian scheme FOPROPI, which became unsustainable and finally collapsed in 1997 as a 
result of major institutional failures.  
Guarantee schemes around the world vary on fundamental design features, but there is 
a growing effort to identify good practices. The failure of several guarantee schems in the 
1980s led to an intensive debate on their role (Levistky, 1997).  As noted by Green (2003) the 
weaknesses  of  early  guarantee  schemes  can  be  avoided  through  proper  design  and 
institutional  arrangement. Some recent  studies provide  guidelines  and discuss  operational 
parameters  of  guarantee  funds,  based  on  international  experience.  Deelen  and  Moleenar 
(2004) published a practical manual for guarantee funds managers.  Along these lines, the 
European Commission  established an expert group on guarantee schemes  to  identify  and 
disseminate best practices (European Commission, 2006).  This literature converges on broad 
principles, including the need to build attractiveness while ensuring  additionality through 
well designed eligibility criteria, proper coverage ratio and fees, sound risk management, and 
efficient operational procedures.   
3  The MENA PCG Survey and the Review Methodology 
3.1  Basic Description of the MENA Survey  
This paper is based on a survey of MENA PCGs conducted in the first quarter of 2010. 
The  questionnaire  prepared  for  the  survey  covered  the  institutional  set  up,  the  main 
operational rules, and the main performance indicators. The questionnaire was partly based 
on Beck and al. (2008) to ensure comparability with other guarantee schemes around the 
world. The survey was initiated in February 2010 and completed in April 2010.  The authors 
met with several managers of surveyed schemes to present the objectives of the survey and 
discuss technical issues.  There was also a follow-up effort to ensure the timely completion of 
the survey and check the accuracy of the data.  
 
The survey covered the largest credit guarantee schemes in 10 MENA countries. As 
shown in Table 1, the oldest guarantee fund in MENA was established in Morocco in 1949, 
while the  youngest  one in  Syria starts operation in  2010.  The average equity is  US$50 
million, ranging from US$10 million in Syria, to US$75 million in Morocco. Half of these 
guarantee schemes are majority state-owned (Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, 
UAE),  while  the  others  are  majority  owned  by  banks  (Lebanon,  Egypt,  Iraq)  or  donors 
(Palestine). 7 
 
3.2  The Review Methodology  
The outcomes  of a  guarantee scheme can be  assessed  along three main dimensions: 
outreach, additionality, and financial sustainability. Outreach refers to the scale of the 
guarantee scheme, as measured by the number of guarantees issued to eligible SMEs and the 
amount of outstanding guarantees. The greater the outreach, the stronger is the impact of the 
scheme on the SME sector. However, the impact of the guarantee scheme will also depend on 
whether guarantees are extended to firms that are credit constrained, and not to firms that 
would be able to obtain a loan anyway. This is why additionality is another key outcome that 
is taken into account. Furthermore, reaching firms that are credit constrained involves risk-
taking and financial losses. Even if the objective of a guarantee scheme is not to make a 
profit, the scheme should still be financially sustainable through sound rules, effective risk 
management, and regular funding.  
Table 1: MENA Partial Credit Guarantee Schemes included in the Survey 






Government  Banks  Other 
Egypt  Credit Guarantee Company  1991  52  -  90  10 
Iraq  Iraqi Company For Bank Guarantees  2007  12    100   
Jordan  Jordanian Loan Guarantee Corp  1994    60  14  20 
Lebanon  Kafalat  1999  50  37.5  62.5  - 
Morocco  Caisse Centrale de Garantie  1949  75  100  -   
Palestine  European-Palestinian Credit Guarantee 
Fund 
2005  40  100 
(funds donated 
by donors) 




Saudi Industrial Development Fund  2005  57  50  50  - 
Syria  Loan Guarantee Institution of Syria    2010  10  94  -  6 
Tunisia  Sotugar  2003  48  100  -   
UAE  Khalifa Fund  2010  NA  90  10  N/A 
 
Designing a  guarantee scheme may entail trade-offs among the main objectives. The 
design  of  a  guarantee  scheme  must  strike  a  balance  between  the  objectives  of  outreach, 
additionality, and financial sustainability. For example, targeting riskier types of borrowers 
through strict eligibility criteria may have a positive impact on additionality, but may also 
reduce outreach and lead to larger losses. Similarly, very high fees improve additionality by 
discouraging banks to use the guarantee for good borrowers, but may reduce outreach, and 
may generate adverse selection effects. The optimal balance between these three objectives 
will depend to a good extent on country conditions.  For example, in countries with more 
serious shortcomings in financial infrastructure and limited SME financing, high outreach 
and high additionality may be achieved simultaneously, while more advanced countries may 
only increase outreach at the expense of additionality.  
The  design  of  guarantee  schemes  in  MENA  was  reviewed  against  general  guiding 
principles and international practice. There is no unique recipe or one-size-fits-all formula 8 
 
for designing effective guarantee schemes. Our review is based on general guiding principles 
derived  from  general  insurance  principles,  a  thorough  literature  review,  and  international 
practice
7. For the international benchmarking, we selected a number of credit guarantee 
schemes  in  developing  and  developed  countries  that  are  reasonably  well-established, 
including  Canada’s  SLFP,  Chile’s  FOGAPE,  Colombia’s  Fondo  Nacional  de  Garantías, 
France’s OSEO, Hungary’s Garantiqa, India’s CGTMSE, Korea’s KODIT, the Netherland’s 
BMKB, Romania’s National Credit Guarantee Fund for SMEs, Taiwan’s SMEG, and the US 
SBA.  Table 2 summarizes the design components and the outcomes that are assessed. 
Table 2: Basic Design Components and Outcomes Assessed 
MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE SCHEME 
Main objectives  Mission statement of the PCG scheme  
RULES OF THE SCHEME 
Eligibility criteria  Characteristics of eligible firms (size, sectors, age) and eligible financing  
Coverage ratio  Percentage of risk taken by the guarantee fund   
Fees  Price of the guarantee 
Payment rules  Triggers related to the payment of the guarantee 
Collateral and down payment  Collateral and down payment required when using the guarantee  
MANAGEMENT OF THE SCHEME 
Operational mechanism  Individual,  portfolio or hybrid approach 
Credit risk management    Credit risk management tools (credit scoring and rating, credit registry) 
Capacity building  Assistance to participating institutions designed to increase their lending 
and risk management capacity  
OUTCOMES OF THE SCHEME 
Outreach  Number of eligible firms that are covered by the scheme 
Additionality  Capacity to target firms that are effectively credit constrained 
Financial sustainability 
Capacity to contain losses and maintain an adequate level of equity given 
the expected liabilities 
4  Reviewing the Design of Partial Credit Guarantee Schemes in MENA 
4.1  Main Objectives of the Scheme 
MENA PCGs generally have broader objectives than those in the benchmark countries. 
As shown in Annex 1, the mission statements of Guarantee Schemes in benchmark countries 
emphasize access to finance for SMEs that lack adequate collateral (Annex 1). By contrast, 
Annex 2 shows that MENA Guarantee Schemes have broader developmental objectives, such 
as  supporting  export  capacity  (Jordan,  Morocco),  fostering  entrepreneurial  spirit  (UAE), 
improving the financial sector’s skill base (Syria, Iraq), facilitating investment in innovation 
(Morocco), and supporting national industrialization programs (Saudi Arabia).  These broad 
                                                           
7 Beck and al. 2008; Honohan 2008 ; Green 2003; European Commission 2006;  Deelen and Molenaar 2004.  9 
 
objectives suggest that MENA schemes interpret the additionality objective more liberally 
than schemes in other countries.  
4.2  Eligibility Criteria 
General guiding principles and international experience 
Eligibility criteria should target financially constrained SMEs while providing for some 
flexibility.    Targeting  is  important  to  ensure  additionality,  although  overly  restrictive 
eligibility criteria should be avoided because there is uncertainty in practice about the firms 
that are credit constrained and the type of financing that  is  lacking.   Very low  ceilings, 
excessive restrictions on the types of loans or eligible sectors may exclude firms that are 
credit  constrained  and  generate  threshold  effects  (excluding  many  firms  just  above  the 
threshold, even if credit constrained).  The relevance of eligibility criteria can be strengthened 
through market surveys that identify SME financing gaps.  
Most guarantee schemes in the benchmark group target SMEs in a broad sense and 
generally do not restrict sectors or types of loans (Table 3).  All the countries in the 
benchmark  group  allow  start-ups  to  apply  for  guarantees  (though  there  is  no  uniform 
definition of start-ups across countries other than in the EU). It is also noticeable that these 
schemes do not impose restrictions on sectors (except for a general restriction on agriculture 
in the case of Canada), or type of loan (again, except for Canada, which does not guarantee 
working capital loans).  
The main differences seem to lie in the limits imposed on firm and loan size.  Korea does 
not impose any limits on firm size, while France and the Netherlands target SMEs following 
the EU’s definition (maximum turnover of 50 million euros and 250 employees).  The other 
countries impose much lower limits on firm size, especially regarding turnover.  However, 
the limits imposed on loan size are probably the binding ones, and here the ranking changes 
significantly, especially when the limit is defined in relation to per capita income.  As shown 
in Table 3, the Asian schemes look more generous in this case, while the Canadian, Dutch 
and US schemes look restrictive by comparison.  
Reviewing Eligibility Criteria in MENA 
Eligibility criteria differ significantly across MENA guarantee schemes.  All schemes 
cover start-ups except for the Palestine, but there are significant differences regarding firm 
size (Table 4).  Some schemes seem generous regarding firm size – Morocco and Tunisia do 
not set any ceilings, while Jordan and Syria set their ceilings  at the high EU level (250 
employees).  By contrast, Egypt, Lebanon and the Palestine restrict the use of guarantees to 
smaller firms (respectively 50, 40 and 20 employees. The employee limit for the Palestine 
scheme is especially low by international comparison. 
 
There are significant differences regarding the maximum size of loans.  The guarantee 
schemes in Morocco and Tunisia cover loans up to US$ 2 million, or the equivalent of 600 
times GDP per capita.  These are high ratios by international standards as shown in Figure 1.  
The ratios in Egypt, Jordan and Syria are lower (150 times GDP per capita), but still high by 
international  standards.    By  contrast,  eligible  loans  in  Lebanon,  the  Palestine,  and  Saudi 




Table 3: Eligibility Criteria in Benchmark Countries 











Chile   Yes  Sales: US$3 million  0.45  All  Yes 
Colombia  Yes  Assets: US$7.3 million  0.97  All (except 
agriculture)  Yes 
France  Yes 









Hungary  Yes 
Sales: 50 million euros or  





1, 3  
All   Yes 
India  Yes  Assets: US$1 million  0.2  All  Yes 
Korea  Yes  All  3  All  Yes 
Malaysia  Yes 
Sales: US$1.6 million 
Employees: 50  
Manufacturing: US$7 million 
Employees: 150   
3  All  Yes 
Netherlands  Yes 
Sales: 50 million euros 
Employees: 250 
1.8  All  Yes 
Romania   
Sales: 50 million euros 
 
Employees: 250 
3.2  All  Yes 
Taiwan, China  Yes 
Services: US$3 million and 100 
employees;  
Manufacturing: 200 employees 
3
1  All  Yes 
US  Yes  Sales: US$7 million  2  All  Yes 
1) Exposure limit 
2) 800/2008 EU regulation for state aid applies 
3) 800/2008 EU regulation for state aid applies to loans counter-guaranteed by the state, and is usually binding 






























7  All  Yes 
Iraq  Yes  Max 50 
employees  0.25  5  All   
Jordan  Yes 
Max 250 
employees 
0.6  8  All  Yes 
Lebanon  Yes 
Max 40 
employees 




High Tech, Crafts 
Yes 
Morocco  Yes  All  1.5*  12  All  Yes 
Palestine  No 
Max 20 
employees 
0.1  5  All  Yes 




Max sales US$ 
5.Million 




Syria  N/A 
Max 250 
employees 
0.4  7  All  No 
Tunisia  Yes  All  2.5  15  Manufacturing, 
some services  No 
UAE  Yes  All  1.3  7  All  Yes 
*Exposure limit on each transaction 
There are also significant differences regarding eligible sectors. Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, 
Palestine,  and  Syria  allow  the  use  of  the  guarantee  for  all  sectors.  A  second  group  of 
countries,  composed  of  Tunisia,  Lebanon  and  Saudi  Arabia,  excludes  trading  and  some 
services. However, there is some uniformity regarding maximum loan maturity, with most 
schemes setting the maximum maturity at 7-8 years, except for Morocco and Tunisia, which 
guarantee loans up to 12-15 years, and the Palestine, which imposes a very short maximum 
maturity.  It is also noticeable that some schemes do not guarantee working capital loans.   
 
There is scope for revising eligibility criteria in some MENA schemes. In some cases, 
eligibility  criteria  could  be  tightened  to  enhance  additionality,  while  in  others  they  look 
overly restrictive and could be relaxed in order to extend finance to small but promising 
firms.  For  example,  in  Morocco  and  Tunisia,  there  is  no  ceiling  on  firm  size  and  the 
maximum loan ceiling is well above the international average (Figure 1). This may encourage 
banks to use the guarantee for large firms and loans, weakening the additionality of those 
schemes. The definition of SMEs in Jordan and Syria are very similar to the definition used 
in the EU (maximum 250 employees), which might not be relevant given their economic 
structures.  On the other extreme, in the Palestine, the maximum size of firms (20 employees) 
seems overly restrictive. This limit can bias against labor-intensive sectors, such as small 
manufacturing firms, and firms having a higher share of formal employees (compared to 
firms  with  large  share  of  informal  employees).  It  can  also  generate  threshold  effects, 
excluding firms just above the threshold, even if credit constrained.   
 12 
 
It is also surprising that some types of financing are restricted in some countries, such 
as the restriction on start-up loans in the Palestine. Similarly, guarantees cannot be used 
for working capital loans in Tunisia and Syria.  Therefore, more flexibility might be needed 
in some schemes in MENA to allow a broader range of firms facing credit constraints to use 
the  guarantee.    At  the  same  time,  the  rationale  for  guaranteeing  loans  with  very  long 
maturities (12-15 years) is not clear as most investment projects implemented by SMEs do 
not have such long durations. 
 
Figure 1: Maximum Size of Eligible loans: MENA and Benchmark countries 
(Scaled by GDP per capita, 2009) 
 
4.3  Coverage Ratios 
General guiding principles and international experience 
Coverage ratios should preserve incentives for effective loan origination and monitoring 
while providing sufficient protection against the risk of default. The coverage ratio needs 
to provide sufficient protection against credit risk, while also preserving incentives for banks 
to screen and monitor borrowers.  Beck et al (2008) show that the median coverage ratio in a 
large sample of PCGs is 80%.  The Chilean experience with bidding procedures shows that 
banks demand a coverage ratio of about 70% to extend long term loans to riskier types of 
borrowers  (Benavente,  2006).    The  bidding  procedure  adopted  in  Chile  provides  an 
interesting market test of the levels of coverage that make the scheme attractive to lenders.
8  
In our comparator group (Table 5), the coverage ratio ranges from 30% to 100% , with a 
median value of about 75%.  
 
                                                           
8 Banks bid for a given amount of guarantees indicating the coverage ratios they are willing to accept for a given 
level of fees. Banks requesting the lowest coverage ratio are those who win the auction.   
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Several PCGs provide higher coverage ratios to riskier types of borrowers.  Banks will 
require higher coverage to extend loans to riskier borrowers.  Many PCGs extend such higher 
coverage  while  also  charging  a  higher  fee.    As  shown  in  Table  5,  in  France  and  the 
Netherlands, the coverage ratio is higher for innovative firms and start-up loans.  In Korea, 
risky firms with low credit scores get higher coverage. In Chile, the maximum coverage ratio 
for small firms is 80%, compared to 50% for medium firms. Setting a higher coverage ratio 
for  riskier  types  of  borrowers  is  a  way  to  enhance  additionality  while  providing  some 
flexibility (less  risky borrowers can use the benefit  from  the guarantee  but  with  a lower 
coverage ratio, and paying a lower fee). 
 
Table 5: Coverage Ratios in Selected Benchmark Countries 
  Coverage ratio  Link to Risk Exposure 
  Min  Median  Max   
Canada  85%  85%  85%  No scalability 
Chile   50%  65%  80% 
80% Small firms (Max sales US$ 750,000; Loan US$ 100,000);  
50% Medium firms (Max sales US$ 3 million; Loan 
US$400,000) 
Colombia  40%  60%  80&  According to type of loan/firm 
France  40%  55%  70%  40%-50% in general, 60% Innovation, 70% start-ups 
Hungary  n/a  n/a  90% 
Max 80% in general, 
Max 60% on agricultural loans 
Max 90% firms affected by the crisis (until end-2010)  
India   75%  80%  85% 
75% in general 
85% on loans to micro firms <= US$ 10,000 
Korea  50%  70%  90% 
Depending on firms credit score: Eligible firms with the lowest 
credit score: 90%,  Firms with the highest credit score: 50% 
Malaysia  30%  65%  100%  According to type of loan/firm 
Netherlands  50%  65%  80%  50% in general, 60% innovative businesses, 80% start-ups 
Romania  n/a  n/a  80%  According to type of loan/firm 
Taiwan  50%  65%  80%  According to type of loan/firm 
USA   75%  80%  85% 
75 % on loans >US$ 150,000 
85 % on loans<= US$ 150,000  
 
Reviewing Coverage Ratios in MENA 
Coverage ratios in MENA are generally in line with international practice, but some 
schemes seem to offer high coverage.  As shown in Tables 6 and 7, the minimum, median, 
and maximum coverage ratios in MENA are similar to those in the benchmark group.  The 
average minimum ratio in MENA is just slightly higher than the equivalent average in the 
benchmark group, the average median is very similar, and the average maximum is actually 
lower (Table 7).  However, there are some differences across counties.  Some schemes seem 14 
 
to have high minimum ratios (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, UAE), and some of these have high 
maximum ratios as well (Lebanon, UAE).  There is scope for calibrating coverage ratios in 
some of these cases. 
Most importantly, some schemes in MENA do not link coverage ratios to the borrowers’ 
risk profile. Morocco,  Tunisia, Egypt  and Saudi  Arabia offer higher  coverage ratios  for 
riskier  types  of  borrowers.  However,  in  Syria,  Jordan,  Iraq,  UAE  and  the  Palestine,  the 
coverage ratio is flat  and not linked to the risk exposure. These schemes could consider 
introducing variable coverage ratios, in line with international practice.   
 
Table 6 : Coverage Ratios of MENA PCGs 
  Coverage ratio  Link to Risk Exposure 
  Min  Median  Max   
  Egypt  50%  60%  70%  Medium firms  50% ( >10 employees); Small firms 75% (< 10 
employees),  
  Iraq  75%  75%  75%  No scalability 
  Jordan  70%  70%  70%  No scalability 
  Lebanon  75%  82.5  90% 
Small-sized loans (< US$ 200,000): 75%, Medium-sized loans 
(< US$ 400,000): 85%;, Innovative loans: 90% 
  Morocco  50%  65%  80% 
Working capital 50% , Fixed assets 60%, Start-ups 80%  (70% 
for loans > US$125,000) 
  Palestine  60%  60%  60%  No scalability 
  Saudi  Arabia  50%  62.5%  75%  General: 50%; Start-ups 75%,  
  Syria  50%  50%  50%  No scalability 
  Tunisia  60%  67.5%  75% 
General: 60%; Prioritized firms 75% (Development zones, start-
ups)  
  UAE  90%  90%  90%  No scalability 
 
Table 7 : Average Coverage ratios in MENA and Benchmark countries 
 
Average Min  Average Median  Average Max 
Benchmark countries  54%  69%  84% 
MENA  63%  68%  74% 
 
4.4   Fees 
General guiding principles and international experience 
Fees should be related to the risk exposure and contribute to the financial sustainability 
of the guarantee scheme.  Linking the price of the guarantee to the risk exposure is a basic 
insurance principle that should generally be adopted by guarantee schemes.  Moreover, fees 
are not only a critical source of revenue (and therefore financial sustainability) for guarantee 15 
 
schemes;  they  also  play  an  important  role  in  building  additionality.    When  fees  are 
sufficiently high, banks are discouraged to use the guarantee for good clients who can obtain 
loans without additional guarantees.   
 
In our benchmark group, the level  of fees  ranges  from 0.8% to 2.3% p.a., with  an 
average fee of 1.5% p.a (Table 8). Note that these are basic standardized rates expressed as a 
percentage  of  the  guarantee  that  are  comparable  across  countries
9.  Although Beck et al 
(2008) report that only 21% of guarantee schemes around the world utilize risk -based fees, 
most of the schemes in our benchmark group link fees to the risk exposure.  For example, in 
the Netherlands, higher fees are charged on guarantees to riskier types of firms, such as start-
ups or innovative firms. In Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan, fees vary according to the credit 
rating of the borrower. In Hungary, fees are determined based on the credit rating of the 
borrower and the risk rating of the loan in the case of loans over approx. €350,000 with 
government  counterguarantee,  and  all  loans  without  government  counterguarantees.  The 
lower the credit score, the higher the fee.  In Chile, the level of fees varies across banks 
according to the quality of their portfolio as measured by the default rate.  
 
Table 8: Fees in Selected Benchmark Countries 
  Fees   





rate (% p.a.) 
Canada 
2% of the loan amount + 1.25% 
p.a. calculated on the loan balance 
2.3%   No scalability 
Chile   1%  to 2% p.a.  1.5% 
Higher fees for banks with higher default 
rates 
Colombia  0.95% - 3.85% p.a.    Fees are link to the product and coverage 
ratio 
France 
0.6% to 0.9% p.a. of the loan 
value  
1.3% 
Fees are linked to the coverage ratio: 
0.6% (40% coverage ratio), 0.9% (70% 
coverage ratio)  
Hungary  1% - 5% p.a. of guarantee amount  2% 
For loans over 350,000 euros, fees vary 
according to firms’ credit ratings 
India  1.5% upfront + 0.75% p.a.   1.5% 
Fees are lower for loans up to US$ 
10,000 (1.25% per annum) 
Korea  0.5 % to 3% p.a.   1.2% 
Higher fees for low credit rating along 
with higher coverage ratio 
Malaysia  0.5% to 3.6% p.a.   1.5%  Higher fees for low credit rating 
Netherlands  2% to 3.6% one-off  1.7%   Fees are linked to the coverage ratio  
Romania  1.5% per annum  1.5%  Fees are linked to the coverage ratio 
Taiwan, China  0.75% to 1.5% per annum  0.8%  Fees are linked to risk profile 
United States 
2%-3.5% of the loan amount + 
annual rate of 0.55% of the 
outstanding guarantee balance 
1.9%  Higher fees for larger loan amounts  
Note: see footnote (7)  
                                                           
9To ensure comparability across guarantees schemes, we converted flat rates into per annum rates, assuming a 
loan maturity is 4 years. The “standardized fee rate” is expressed as a percentage of the guarantee amount. 
When several fee rates exist, we take the fee of the most important guarantee product (the “basic rate”). 16 
 
Reviewing Guarantee Fees in MENA 
Some MENA schemes do not seem to price their guarantees adequately. The average fee 
charged by MENA schemes is 1.5% p.a., similar to the average fee in the benchmark group 
(Table 9).  However, some MENA schemes seem to underprice the guarantee (Figure 2), 
which  may  undermine  financial  sustainability  and  weaken  additionality.  Moreover,  most 
MENA schemes do not link the price of the guarantee to the risk exposure, excepting for 
Morocco. These countries may consider linking more closely the fee to the coverage ratio and 
other aspects of the risk exposure.   
 
Table 9: Fees Charged by MENA PCGs 
 
Fees 




  Egypt  2% per annum   2%  Lower fees for health care  
  Iraq  2% per annum  2%  No 
  Jordan  1%-1.5%  N/A  N/A 
  Lebanon  2.5% per annum  2.5%  No 
  Morocco  2% of the loan value (flat)  1% 
2% flat in general,  
0.5% on working capital   
1.5%  for start-ups ≤ US$ 125,000 
  Palestine 
1% of the original loan amount 
1. 5% annual commission on 





  Saudi  Arabia  N/A  N/A  No 
  Syria  N/A  N/A  No 
  Tunisia  0.6% per annum    0.6% 
1% flat short-term loan (standardized 
1.2%) 
 UAE  N/A  N/A  No 












Figure 2: Standardized Fees 
(Percentage per annum, standardized basic rate) 
 
Note: see footnote (8)  
 
4.5   Payment Rules 
General guiding principles and international experience 
The payment of claims should be quick and predictable in order to build the credibility 
of the guarantee scheme, while encouraging loan collection.  The capacity to pay promptly 
the claims is a key factor to induce banks to use the guarantee. However, the challenge is to 
design a payment rule which is reliable while providing incentives for loan recovery. There 
are four types of payment rules that can be considered: (i) a single payment after default is 
validated; (ii) a single payment after legal actions are initiated; (iii) partial payment at the 
time of default, followed by the remaining payment when judicial procedures are exhausted; 
and (iv) single payment when judicial procedures are exhausted.  Beck et al (2008) show that 
in 66% of guarantee schemes around the world, banks are responsible for the recovery of 
defaulting loans. Moreover, in 34% of the schemes payouts are made after the borrower 
defaults.  In 42% of the schemes, payout takes place when the bank initiates legal actions. In 
only 14% of the schemes payment is held until the bank writes off the loan.  
 
The choice of a payment rule should take into account the efficiency of the judicial 
system.  In countries with efficient judicial systems, the payment of claims can be made 
when all judicial procedures are exhausted. In France, Canada, and the US, claims are paid on 
the  basis  of  realized  losses,  once  all  judicial  procedures  are  completed.    However,  in 
countries where the judicial system is less efficient, paying claims at the end of the judicial 
process may result in long waiting periods and losses to lenders, and hinder the attractiveness 
of the guarantee scheme. Table 10 provides an illustration of the differences in the efficiency 
of loan collection among MENA countries and the benchmark group. The numbers in the 
table apply to the judicial system, and do not necessarily represent recovery rates and times 






















Table 10: Efficiency of the Judicial Process in MENA and Benchmark Countries 
(Doing Business 2010) 
Country  Recovery rate 
(cents on the dollar) 
Time (years) 
MENA  27.7  3.4 
Egypt  16.8  4.2 
Iraq  NA  NA 
Jordan  27.3  4.3 
Lebanon  19  4 
Morocco  35.1  1.8 
Saudi Arabia  37.5  1.5 
Syria  29.5  4.1 
Tunisia  52.3  1.3 
UAE  10.2  5.1 
Benchmark Countries  70.4  1.6 
Canada  88.7  0.8 
Chile  21.3  4.5 
Colombia  35.3  1.7 
France  44.7  1.9 
Hungary  38.4  2.0 
India   15  7 
Korea  80.5  1.5 
Malaysia  38.6  2.3 
Netherlands  82.7  1.1 
Romania  28.5  3.3 
Taiwan, China  80.9  1.9 
United States  76.7  1.5 
 
Reviewing Payment Rules in MENA 
MENA countries are exploring different ways to reconcile payment efficiency and loan 
collection.  Most MENA guarantee schemes have rules that allow payment of claims before 
legal procedures are exhausted (Table 11). This is probably the right approach, given the 
relatively low efficiency of judicial procedures in MENA – as shown in Table 11, the average 
recovery rate in MENA is 28% compared to 70% in the benchmark group, and the time 
needed to complete the process is 3.4 years, compared to 1.6 years in the benchmark group.    
 
In order to induce banks to collect defaulting loans, some guarantee schemes in MENA 
are  testing  different  incentive  structures.  Morocco  and  Tunisia  provide  an  advance 
payment of 50% once the claim is presented, followed by the balance once legal procedures 
are exhausted. Lebanon’s Kafalat makes the payment 90 days after the claim is validated, but 
recovers itself the collateral. In Syria, the payment is deposited in an escrow account at the 
bank until the legal procedures are exhausted.  
 
These models have not been sufficiently tested yet, and it is too early to assess their 
effectiveness.    The  hybrid  payment  rules  offer  a  potential  solution  to  the  challenge  of 
building credibility while promoting loan collection by the banks, but these systems have not 19 
 
been sufficiently tested. The hybrid rules will need to be further assessed using cost-benefit 
analysis and feedback from lenders. Hybrid systems should in any case include a maximum 
period (as in the case of Morocco) to avoid too much uncertainty for guarantee users. 
 
Table 11: Payment Rules in MENA 
Iraq  Single payment 30 days after the bank initiates legal procedures. 
Jordan  After the bank initiates legal procedures to recover the debt. Single payment once the 
claim is presented and validated. 
Lebanon  Payment 90 days after 3 unpaid installments. Single payment once the claim is presented 
and validated. The guarantor  is mainly responsible for recovering the collateral 
Morocco  Advance payment of a 50% once the claim is presented and validated, followed by the 
balance once legal procedures have been exhausted  (maximum 3 years) 
Palestine  Single payment after six months from default date 
Saudi Arabia  After  a  fixed  number  of  days  following  default.  Single  payment  once  the  claim  is 
presented and validated   
Syria   Money is deposited in an escrow account at the bank until the legal procedures are 
exhausted. 
Tunisia  Advance payment of a 50% once the claim is presented and validated, followed by the 
balance once legal procedures have been exhausted 
UAE  Single payment once the claim is presented and validated. The guarantor  is mainly 
responsible for recovering the collateral 
 
4.6   Collateral and Down-payment Rules 
General guiding principles and international experience 
Guarantee schemes should be allowed to require collateral and down payments subject 
to reasonable limits.  One of the main roles of guarantee schemes is precisely to compensate 
for the lack of collateral hindering SME access to finance. However, the complete absence of 
collateral may generate adverse selection and moral hazard effects and ultimately result in 
large losses for the scheme. To mitigate this risk, the scheme should be allowed to require 
whatever  collateral  is  available  up  to  reasonable  limits.    For  example,  in  France  and  in 
Canada, the schemes are allowed to require personal guarantees but these guarantees are 
capped respectively at 50% and 25% of the loan value. 
Reviewing Collateral Rules in MENA 
Most  MENA  guarantee  schemes  allow  banks  to  take  collateral  but  do  not  impose 
ceilings  (Table  12).  This  may  contradict  the  objectives  of  PCGs,  although  there  is  little 
information on additional collateral provided by guarantee users in MENA. This information 
should be collected and disclosed.  Some enterprise surveys conducted by the World Bank 
indicate  that  banks  in  MENA  tend  to  require  high  levels  of  collateral  even  when  using 20 
 
guarantees,  which  can  defeat  the  purpose  of  a  guarantee  scheme
10.  Some countries set 
ceilings for collateral, such as Morocco (maximum collateral of 100%), and more recently 
Lebanon (50%).  However, most other schemes do not impose ceilings.    
 
Many MENA schemes also impose minimum down-payment rules. Requiring minimum 
contributions from borrowers can be an effective way to reduce adverse selection and moral 
hazard, especially for riskier types of loans, such as start-ups or long term investments. This 
feature is used in many MENA countries. With a significant down payment the loan amount 
represents  a  smaller  percentage  of  the  value  of  collaterized  assets,  thus  improving  the 
(theoretical)  recovery  expectancy.    Moreover,  the  down-payment  rules  seem  reasonable, 
capped at about 20%-30% of the project value.  
 
Table 12: Collateral and Down-payment Rules in MENA 
  Down-payment   Collateral  
Egypt  Medium firms: 20%   Allowed, no ceiling 
Jordan  30% SME loan, 30% industrial loan, 
Leasing 50% 
Allowed, no ceiling 
Lebanon  Kafalat plus: 20% of total investment, 
30% if start ups  
Allowed, Ceiling of 50% of the loan amount 
(Kafalat Basic) 
Morocco  Start-up loans: 10%-20% depending on 
the loan amount 
Allowed, Ceiling of 100% of the loan amount 
Palestine  No  Allowed, no ceiling (in practice, the majority 
of loans are not secured against collateral) 
Tunisia  30% of the cost of the investment  Allowed, no ceiling 
Saudi Arabia  No  Allowed, no ceiling 
Syria  N/A  N/A 
 
4.7   Operational Mechanisms 
General guiding principles and international experience 
Guarantees  can  be  delivered  though  the  individual,  portfolio  or  hybrid  approaches.  
Under  the  individual  approach,  every  loan  application  is  assessed  and  approved  by  the 
guarantee  scheme.  The  portfolio  approach  is  more  flexible  and  allows  banks  to  extend 
guarantees  without  consulting  the  guarantee  scheme.  Each  bank  receives  a  guarantee 
allocation which can be used for eligible firms.  The hybrid approach mixes elements of 
individual and portfolio approaches: certified lenders can extend guarantees without referring 
to the guarantee scheme up to a limit; above a certain threshold, the guarantee scheme adopts 
an individual approach and appraises the loan application before extending the guarantee. 
Beck et al (2008) report that 72% of schemes surveyed use the individual approach, 14% the 
portfolio approach, and 9% the hybrid approach. The schemes in our benchmark group adopt 
either the portfolio approach (Canada, Netherlands, UK, and Chile) or the hybrid approach 
(France, USA, Taiwan, Hungary, and Korea) as shown in Table 13.  
                                                           
10 Lebanon Investment Climate Assessment, World Bank, 2009 21 
 
Each  approach  has  its  advantages  and  limits.  The  main  advantage  of  the  individual 
approach is its potential to better control credit risk and ensure financial sustainability. In the 
case of banking systems with less experience with SME lending, the individual approach has 
another important value added, namely it allows the provision of information and technical 
support by the scheme to the bank through exchanges during the decision making process. By 
contrast,  the portfolio approach involves  higher risks  for  guarantee schemes, but  reduces 
substantially operational and transaction costs. The hybrid approach aims to combine the 
advantages of the two approaches, while overcoming their limitations.   
 
Table 13: Operational Mechanisms Adopted in the Benchmark Countries 
Countries  Operational Mechanism 
Canada  Portfolio 
Chile   Portfolio: FOGAPE auctions available guarantee amounts, with the lenders bidding 
on the coverage ratio.  
Colombia  Hybrid 
France  Hybrid : individual in general, delegation of guarantee decision to banks for 
loans<US$ 140,000 (only for certified lenders) 
Hungary 
Hybrid: for guarantees subject to simplified and standardized procedures guarantee 
decision is delegated to banks (only for certified lenders). Individual assessment: for 
non-standardized transactions  
India  
Authorized approach: the guarantee scheme does not re-evaluate the proposals 
sanctioned by certified lenders.  If the proposals satisfy the basic norms, the 
guarantee is automatically extended. 
Korea  Hybrid:  95% of guarantees are issued under the Direct approach (borrowers get a 
guarantee certificate directly from the KODIT) 
Malaysia 
Hybrid: introduction of a new approach called guarantee. The borrower applies 
online, and after the application is reviewed by CGC, lenders are invited to bid 
online on the application. 
Netherland  Portfolio 
Romania  Hybrid: Individual guarantee or Standardized small guarantees (max US$ 120,000 
granted under a simplified procedure, “scoring” type assessment of SME) 
Taiwan  Hybrid: Authorized approach (delegation) or Direct guarantee (borrowers get a 
guarantee certificate directly from the SMEG) 
United States  Hybrid: individual in general. Faster process for “certified lenders”. Delegation of 
guarantee decision to “preferred lenders”. 
 
Reviewing Operational Mechanisms in MENA 
The great majority of MENA schemes have adopted the individual approach. As shown 
in  Table  14,  most  guarantee  schemes  in  MENA  have  adopted  the  traditional  individual 
approach. Morocco has introduced a hybrid approach, whereby banks can extend guarantees 
to start-ups (for loans up to US$ 700,000) without consulting the scheme. This option has 
been extensively used by banks, and 50% of all guarantees to start-ups are granted under 
delegation. In Egypt, a portfolio approach is used for micro loans.   
 22 
 
MENA schemes  could consider a partial  delegation of guarantee decisions  to banks 
provided that some prerequisites are met.  Delegating guarantee decisions for small loans 
could be considered by more guarantee schemes in MENA, especially in countries where 
banks  have  sufficient  capacity  to  deal  with  SME  risk.  Guarantee  delegation  should  be 
accompanied by risk mitigation tools, such as stop loss rules and risk-based fees (higher fees 
for banks demonstrating higher default rate).  
 
Table 14: Operational Mechanisms in MENA 
Countries  Operational Mechanism 
Egypt  Individual (portfolio only for micro-loans) 
Iraq  NA 
Jordan  Individual 
Lebanon  Individual, to become hybrid from second half of 2010. 
Morocco 
Hybrid: Individual in general. Delegation of guarantee decision to banks  for start-
ups loans<US$ 70,000, to be extended to all loans below US$ 70,000 from second 
half of 2010.      
Palestine  Individual  
Saudi  Arabia  Individual 
Syria  Individual 
Tunisia 
Individual, but all eligible operations are accepted (no risk analysis made by 
SOTUGAR)  
UAE  Individual 
4.8  Risk Management and Regulation 
General guiding principles and international experience 
Effective credit risk management by the participating banks and the scheme itself can 
have a substantial impact on the sustainability of guarantee schemes. Well established 
guarantee schemes around the world have developed internal credit scoring systems and also 
rely intensively on information provided by credit bureaus and registries. In some countries 
such  as  Malaysia  and  Korea,  guarantee  schemes  have  developed  their  own  SME  credit 
bureaus.  Some  guarantee  schemes  have  also  provided  assistance  to  banks  in  SME  risk 
analysis and management. When interacting with banks, guarantee schemes can share their 
expertise and disseminate their methodologies and credit scoring models.   
 
PCGs  should  be  subject  to  high  prudential  standards  and  supervision  regardless 
whether they are under special legislation or the general rules applying to financial 
institutions. If PCGs comply with high prudential standards, financial supervisory authorities 




Reviewing the quality of risk management in MENA 
MENA guarantee schemes seem to be strengthening their risk management capacity.  
Most  guarantee  schemes  in  the  region  report  using  credit  scoring  models  to  assess  loan 
applications.  The  recent  development  of  private  credit  bureaus  in  the  region  and  the 
upgrading of some public credit registries will be instrumental in improving the quality of 
their credit risk management.
11  
 
Regulation  and  supervision  of  MENA  PCGs  is  not  common.  This  can  have  negative 
consequences  e.g.  in  terms  of  inadequate  risk  management  by  PCGs.  Another  adverse 
consequence of the lack of supervision is that PCG guarantees may not be used as credit 
mitigation. 
4.9   Capacity Building to Participating Institutions 
General guiding principles and international experience 
Many PCGs provide technical assistance to participating banks and borrowers, and this 
service can contribute significantly to the effectiveness of the scheme.
12 This capacity-
building potential is often overlooked in the literature, but can constitute a major positive 
externality  of  guarantee  schemes  since  PCGs  can  improve  significantly  lending  and  risk 
management  technologies,  resulting  ultimately  in  improved  outreach,  additionality,  and 
sustainability. For example, France’s OSEO shares risk management tools with participating 
institutions and trains bank staff in this area.  Many schemes such as Korea’s KODIT and 
Taiwan China’s SMEG also provide assistance to SMEs in the areas of accounting, business 
plan preparation, management and marketing. Capacity building for financial institutions in 
the areas  of  credit  evaluation and  risk management are especially important in  countries 
where SME lending is limited and banks have inadequate expertise in this business line.  
Reviewing capacity building efforts in MENA 
Most MENA PCGs still do not provide assistance to participating institutions. Although 
the objectives of several PCGs (such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria) state explicitly that the 
scheme intends to contribute to an improvement in SME lending know-how in the financial 
sector (e.g. credit evaluation and risk management), capacity building is usually not included 
in the services offered. In this regard, the Palestine PCG is a noticeable exception and a good 
example of a scheme that provides substantial assistance to participating banks and borrowers 
(Box 1). Introducing similar practices is highly recommended to other PCGs in the region 









                                                           
11 Maddedu (2010) provides a review of credit reporting systems in MENA. 
12 See e.g. Green (2003) for a comprehensive discussion on other elements of PCG design. 24 
 
Box 1. Training program by the European Palestinian Credit Guarantee Fund 
(EPCGF) 
 
As an integral part of its mission, the EPCGF provides an extensive training program to its 
partner banks to strengthen financial institutions’ capacity in SME lending. As part of its 
training  program,  the  EPCGF  awards  credit  officer,  marketing  officer,  and  credit 
management  diplomas.  By  end-2009,  46  training  modules  have  been  conducted,  with 
participation  of  183  employees  of  partner  banks.  It  also  offers  train-the-trainers  capacity 
building programs. The EPCGF considers its training program as one of the scheme’s key 
success factors in expanding outreach and the high quality of its portfolio. These training 
programs can play an important role in building up banks’ capacity in various areas of SME 
lending, in risk management in particular, similar initiatives should be considered in other 
MENA countries, especially where SME lending is in a nascent stage.  
 
 
4.10   The Use of Counter-Guarantees  
General guiding principles and international experience 
Counter-guarantees, a form of reinsurance, can significantly raise outreach as it can 
multiply the capacity of a PCG. Counter-guarantees are common in Europe both at the 
supranational  (e.g.  European  Investment  Fund)  and  national  levels.  For  example,  in  our 
benchmarking group, Hungary’s Garantiqa has been able to achieve a high equity multiplier 
due to the high share of guarantees counter-guaranteed by the government. While they can be 
useful in expanding outreach, the use of counter-guarantees needs careful consideration and 
should be accompanied by adequate regulation and supervision of the PCG scheme. Counter-
guarantees may have adverse fiscal implications as they may increase contingent liabilities. 
Reviewing the use of counter-guarantees in MENA 
Counter-guarantees are not utilized in MENA at this point and consideration could be given 
to introducing them in the future as the schemes mature. However, MENA countries would 
also  need  to  be  mindful  of  the  potential  risk  of  excessive  leverage  and  adverse  fiscal 
implications of counter-guarantees.  
5  Preliminary Assessment of Outcomes 
5.1  Outreach 
Measurement and international experience 
 
The outreach of a guarantee scheme refers to the capacity of the scheme to meet the 
potential demand for guarantees from eligible SMEs.  Ideally, outreach should be assessed 
against the SME finance gap, defined as the difference between the SME demand for bank 
finance and the available lending. The higher the number of creditworthy firms that are credit 
constrained in  the country, the  greater is  the size of the potential market  for guarantees. 
However, given the difficulty in carrying out this estimation, outreach is commonly assessed 
using basic indicators such as the number of guarantees issued or the amount of outstanding 
guarantees scaled by GDP.  25 
 
 
The average ratio of outstanding guarantees to GDP is about 0.3%, as reported by Beck 
et  al  (2008).    As  shown  in  Table  15,  the  average  size  of  outstanding  guarantees  in  our 
benchmark group is much higher at 1.2% of GDP, due the greater weight of Asian countries.  
These countries have much larger schemes with outstanding guarantees as a percentage of 
GDP reaching 5% in Korea, 3.5% in Taiwan, and 1% in Malaysia.  Canada, the Netherlands 
and the US have smaller schemes (about 0.2% of GDP), while France and Chile stand in an 
intermediate position (about  0.5% of GDP).  In 2009, these  guarantee  schemes issued on 
average 2,100 guarantees per million people, and the average value of guarantees issued in 
2009 was about 5 times per capita income.  Again, there are substantial differences across 
schemes. According to these measures, the Asian schemes lead in terms of outreach.   
 
Table 15: Outreach of Guarantee Schemes in Benchmark Countries 
  Number of guarantees 
issued  in 2009 
Outstanding guarantees in 
2009 
Average value of guarantees 














Canada  10,000  300  2,000  0.1  100,000  2.5 
Chile   60,000  1,800  1,000  0.6  10,000  1.0 
Colombia  200,000  4,440  1,380  0.6  13,000  2.4 
France  80,000  1,250  10,000  0.4  60,000  1.4 
Hungary  31,000  3100  2,680  1.9  76,500  5.5 
India   100,000  100  1300  0.1  10,000  10 
Korea  200,00  5,000  50,000  5.0  125,000  7.0 
Malaysia  14,000  400  2,000  1.0  66,000  9.4 
Netherland  3,200  200  1,500  0.2  230,000  5.0 
Romania  6,600  285  700  0.4  80,000  10 
Taiwan  220,000  8,000  12,000  3.5  50,000  3.0 
United States  50,000  130  30,000  0.2  150,000  3.2 
 Average  81,200  2080  9550  1.2  80,880  5.0 
Note: Colombia figures are for 2008 
Assessing Outreach in MENA 
The  average  size  of  guarantee  schemes  in  MENA  is  broadly  consistent  with 
international  standards.    As  shown  in  Table  16  and  Figure  3,  the  average  size  of 
outstanding  guarantees  in MENA is  0.3% of GDP.  This  ratio is  much smaller  than the 
average ratio of the benchmark group, but comparable to the average ratio of 76 schemes 
reported  by  Beck  et  al  (2008)  and  with  the  average  ratio  of  non-Asian  schemes  in  the 
benchmark group (both around 0.3% of GDP).  Large schemes in MENA, such as Lebanon, 
Morocco, and Tunisia compare favorably to non-Asian schemes, the Palestine is close to the 26 
 
average, while guarantee schemes in Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia look modest by 
international standards.
13 However, the outreach of MENA guarantees schemes is expanding 
fast, especially the smaller schemes (Figure 4), with annual growth rate ranging from 20% to 
more than 100%. This reflects the growing demand for SME finance as well as increasing 
government support in these countries.  
 
Despite  a  relatively  large  amount  of  guarantees  outstanding,  the  number  of  firms 
reached still looks small. In terms of numbers of guarantees issued per population, MENA 
schemes compare poorly to those in other regions. As shown in Table 16 and Figure 5, on 
average, MENA schemes issued only 80 guarantees per million people in 2009, compared to 
2,100 in the benchmark group and 1400 in the non-Asian schemes in the group. With 292 
guarantees  per million  people issued in  2009,  Lebanon’s Kafalat  is  the top  performer in 
MENA, followed by the Palestine scheme (128).   
 
The average size of guarantees in MENA is large by international standards, suggesting 
that  guarantees  are  concentrated  in  a  narrower  SME  segment  and  possibly  larger 
SMEs.  On average, the average value of guarantees in MENA amounts to 21 times per 
capita income, compared to the average of 4 in the benchmark group (Tables 15 and 16 and 
Figure 6). Among MENA countries, the ratios in Morocco and Tunisia seem particularly 
high, with average guarantees reaching 60 and 33 times per capita income, respectively. The 
high  average  value  of  guarantees  in  these  two  countries  probably  reflects  their  broader 
eligibility criteria (Section 4.1), and the focus on manufacturing. All in all, these numbers 
suggest that many guarantee schemes in MENA still concentrate on medium-sized firms, and 
do not reach yet the bulk of small firms.   
 
Table 16: Outreach of MENA PCGs 
  Number of guarantees 
issued  in 2009 
Outstanding guarantees in 2009 
Average value of 

















  Egypt**  3,595  45  162  0.07  9  37,830  22 
  Iraq  964  33  8  0.01  NA  10,000  5 
  Jordan  245  41  16  0.07  1.4  37,700  10 
  Lebanon  1,169  292  292  0.9  10  117,000  14.6 
Morocco  1,119  33  374  0.4  4.2  155,000  60 
  Palestine  539  128  18  0.3  33  18,000  11.4 
 Saudi    
Arabia  504  18  69  0.03*  3.2  95,000  13 
  Tunisia  522  52  200  0.5  8.1  134,000  33.5 
  Average  1,082  80  142  0.32  10%  75,000   
* Non-oil 
** Excluding micro-loans 
 
                                                           
13 In the case of Lebanon, various government interest rate subsidies related to Kafalat-guaranteed products 
make the scheme attractive for SMEs and banks.  Lower reserve requirements by the Central Bank related to 
SME lending provide an additional layer of support.    27 
 
 
Figure 3: Outstanding guarantees  
(as a percent of GDP, 2009) 
 
Source: Respective PCG schemes 
 
Figure 4: Outstanding guarantees  
(US$ Million, 2009) 
 
Source: Respective PCG schemes 
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Figure 5: Number of guarantees issued per year  
(per million people, 2009) 
 
Source: Respective PCG schemes 
Figure 6: Average size of guarantees  
(scaled by GDP per capita, 2009) 
 
5.2  Additionality 
Measurement and International Experience 
Additionality is one the primary objectives of guarantee schemes.  Additionality refers to 
the  capacity  of  a  guarantee  scheme  to  provide  access  to  finance  to  SMEs  which  are 
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effectively credit constrained.  Additionality also refers also to the developmental impact of 
the  scheme,  including  the  survival  rate  of  firms,  investment,  growth,  and  job  creation. 
Additionality  also  has  another  dimension,  namely,  the  depth  of  financing:  longer  term 
financing instead of short term, financing of immaterial and intangible assets, financing of 
project type traditionally excluded by the banking sector.  
 
Assessing  additionality  remains  technically  challenging.  Assessing  additionality  entails 
comparing  the  financial  and  economic  performance  of  guarantee  users  (the  “treatment 
group”) to  those of non-users  (the “control  group”). The main  challenge is  to  identify  a 
correct control group, consisting of firms with similar characteristics to those of the guarantee 
users. As shown in Table 17, there are several  methods used to  assess additionality (see 
Annex  2  for  more  details).  Some  country  studies  conclude  that  their  guarantee  schemes 
generate significant additionality (Table 18), but assessing additionality remains technically 
challenging (see e.g., World Bank 2008).  
 
Table 17: Alternative Methods to Assess Additionality 
Methodologies   Description 
Interviews  
The basic way of measuring additionality consists of asking guarantee users and bankers: 
“would you have obtained (extended) the loan without using the guarantee scheme?”  
Descriptive statistics  
The share of guarantees extended to riskier types of borrowers (e.g. small firms, start-ups, 
firms seeking long-term finance, or SMEs with low risk scoring results) can be used as a 
proxy to assess additionality.  
Propensity score 
matching 
This method is based on a survey of enterprises, and employs econometric techniques to 
make the “control group” more comparable to the group of guarantee users, controlling for 
firms’ characteristics.   
Regression 
discontinuity  
Many  guarantee  schemes  use  credit  scoring  to  allocate  guarantees  to  applicants.  This 
method compares firms around the cut-off point. The “control group” is composed of firms 
just above the line, while the “treatment group” is composed of firms just below.   
Natural and quasi-
natural experiment 
This method is based on a naturally occurring event that differently affects different groups 
of firms (e.g. change of eligibility criteria, use of guarantees by different banks, at different 
point of time or in different regions)  
Randomized 
experiment  
A control group is selected using a random process. Some eligible firms applying for the 
guarantee are randomly rejected. Additionality is measured by comparing these firms to a 
random sample of guarantee users.  
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Table 18: Findings of Selected Country Studies 
Country  Study  Methodology  Results 
Canada  Ridding, Madill and 
Haines (2007) 
Propensity score matching 
 
75% of guarantee users would 
not have been able to get a loan 
without the guarantee 
Chile   Larrain and Quiroz (2006)  Quasi-Natural experiment 
(participation of banks at different 
point of time)  
The scheme increases the 
probability of small firms to get 
a loan by 14% 
France  Lelarge, Sraer, Thesmar 
(2008) 
Quasi-Natural experiment 
(extension of the guarantee scheme) 
Significant additionality 
Korea  Oh, Lee,  Choi and 
Heshmati (2006) 
Propensity score matching  Significant additionality 
Malaysia   Boocock, Sharif (2005)  Interviews of guarantee users  Additionality 
UK  Cowling (2010)  Propensity score matching  Significant additionality 
US  GAO (2007)  Descriptive statistics (comparison 
of the credit score of guarantee 
users to the score of non-guarantee 
users) 
Additional measures are needed 
to evaluate additionality 
 
Assessing Additionality in MENA 
Until  now,  there  have  been  no  rigorous  evaluations  of  the  additionality  of  MENA 
schemes.  Most  guarantee  schemes  in  MENA  have  not  yet  conducted  rigorous  impact 
evaluation studies to examine their degree of additionality and economic impact.  This is 
partly due to the fact that some of these schemes are not sufficiently mature, but this is a 
deficiency  that  should  be  addressed  in  the  near  future,  as  these  evaluations  can  provide 
substantive insights for improvements in the design and effectiveness of the scheme.   
5.3  Financial Sustainability 
Measurement and International Experience 
The financial sustainability of a guarantee scheme refers to its capacity to contain losses 
and maintain an adequate equity base vis-a-vis its expected liabilities.  One of the basic 
indicators used to assess the financial sustainability of a guarantee scheme is the equity ratio 
(the  ratio  of  equity  to  outstanding  guarantees)  or  inversely  the  multiplier  (the  ratio  of 
outstanding guarantees to equity).
14 A sound guarantee scheme should maintain the multiplier 
below a certain threshold, which would depend on the risk of the portfolio.  When the 
multiplier exceeds the target value, the guarantee scheme should take actions to reduce its 
costs, increase its revenues, or get additional funding.  Multipliers of guarantee schemes vary 
widely from 3 to 20, reflecting government policies, risk management, and also the maturity 
of the scheme (Figure 7). Some guarantee schemes use counter-guarantees, allowing them to 
increase their leverage.  
 
Sound rules and effective risk management are essential to contain losses and preserve 
the  equity  base.  Although  60%  of  guarantee  schemes  around  the  world  are  not  profit-
oriented (Beck et al, 2008), containing losses is key to ensuring financial sustainability.  As 
                                                           
14 The equity ratio is roughly equivalent to the solvency ratio in the insurance sector.  31 
 
shown in Figure 8, all countries in the benchmark group, have kept net loss ratios (payment 
of claims/outstanding guarantees) below the 3-4 percent threshold, even when targeting risky 
types of borrowers.  Chile and the Netherlands report the lowest net loss ratios (1.5%), while 
the  Hungarian  scheme  reports  the  highest  ratio  (4%).    These  net  loss  ratios  need  to  be 
interpreted with care, however, as guarantee schemes have different maturities and portfolio 
compositions, and some may be accumulating risks that are not yet reflected in the numbers.  
 
Equity increases are often needed to sustain the growth of the scheme while maintaining 
the multiplier under the target. Most guarantee schemes in our benchmark group do not 
make profits.  Therefore, to sustain the growth of the guarantee scheme, additional funding is 
often  needed  from  governments,  donors,  or  private  shareholders.  In  Canada  and  France, 
guarantee  schemes  are  funded  through  regular  budget  appropriations.  In  Chile,  the 
government does not make regular contributions to the guarantee scheme, but has recently 
increased the equity of FOGAPE from US$ 50 Million to US$100  million to enable the 
scheme to cope with the effects of the financial crisis. In Korea, a tax of 0.3% of total lending 
is  imposed  on  banks  to  finance  KODIT.  When  the  guarantee  scheme  makes  losses  and 
requires  government  contributions,  there  is  a  presumption  that  the  policy  intervention 
generates net benefits (see Honohan (2008) for a more detailed discussion).   
Assessing Financial Sustainability in MENA 
Guarantee schemes in MENA are not over-leveraged or equity-constrained. As shown in 
Figure 7, the average multiplier in MENA is 3.4, ranging from 0.45 in Palestine to 5.8 in 
Lebanon. These are low leverage ratios by international comparison. Moreover, the survey 
responses show that guarantee schemes in  MENA do not  perceive themselves as  equity-
constrained either, as they are financially supported by their governments or donors.   
 
The average net loss ratio of MENA schemes is low. As shown in Figure 8, net loss ratios 
in MENA are moderate – below 1% in most countries, except in Saudi Arabia where it 
reaches 3%. In the Palestine, only 4 claims were received from 2005 to 2009, out of 1,200 
guarantees issued. As a result, several guarantee schemes in MENA show positive net results.  
For example, Lebanon’s Kafalat generates a return on equity of 10%.  The low default rate 
observed in MENA could be attributed to prudent risk management and to the practice of 
banks of requiring collateral with a value frequently exceeding the loan amount (on top of the 
scheme guarantee).  However, the low default rate could also reflect the fact that some of 
these schemes are not yet reaching the smaller SMEs, or that the schemes are still young. As 
the stock of outstanding guarantees grows, guarantee schemes in MENA will accumulate 








Figure 7: Equity multiplier 
(Outstanding guarantees/ Equity) 
 
Source: Respective PCG schemes 
 
Figure 8: Net loss ratios 











































6  Summary of Findings and Policy Implications 
Partial  credit  guarantee  schemes  can  play  an  important  role  in  MENA  countries.  
Improving financial infrastructure should remain the policy priority in MENA, but guarantee 
schemes can also make an important contribution to SME finance, especially in the period 
when governments are making an effort to remedy the deficiencies in credit information and 
creditor rights. There is some empirical evidence suggesting that guarantee schemes have 
contributed to SME lending in some MENA countries or, equivalently, that countries with 
larger schemes have larger shares of SME lending in total lending.
15  However, this result 
does  not  necessary  imply  that  MENA  guarantee  schemes  are  well  designed  and  cost -
effective.   Improvements in design could arguably  allow these schemes to reach a larger 
number of constrained SMEs with the same volume of resources.   
 
This paper reported the results of a survey of guarantee schemes in the region and 
represents  the  first  effort  to  assess  their  effectiveness.    Ten  guarantee  schemes  were 
covered by the survey, varying significantly in size and maturity.   The paper reviews the 
design of the schemes against a diversified benchmark group comprising developing and 
developed countries, and makes a preliminary assessment of outcomes.   
 
Regarding the main outcomes, outreach indicators portray a mixed picture. The average 
size of guarantee schemes in MENA is in line with the international average (outstanding 
guarantees  amount to  about  0.3%  of GDP).  However,  there are wide differences  across 
countries, and some schemes seem too small to make any significant impact on SME lending. 
More importantly, the number of guarantees issued per year (scaled by the population) looks 
very low by international comparison, while the average value of guarantees seems relatively 
large.  This suggests that guarantees are still concentrated in a relatively limited segment of 
firms, and do not yet reach a significant number of smaller firms.  
 
The survey responses do not allow for a meaningful assessment of additionality.  MENA 
schemes are not yet conducting systematic impact evaluations, to measure the extent to which 
they have succeeded in targeting financially constrained firms.  Some schemes seem more 
targeted than others, but the available indicators do not allow for a meaningful assessment of 
additionality.   
 
Guarantee schemes in MENA look financially sound and most schemes have room to 
grow. Guarantee schemes in MENA report comparatively low net loss ratios and are not 
highly leveraged.  Most schemes have a sufficient equity base to grow further and improve 
their outreach, while some schemes may require a large equity base to achieve a meaningful 
size and make an impact on SME lending.  However, this growth should be accompanied 
by an improvement of key design and management features, as well as the introduction 
of systematic impact evaluation reviews.  
 
Regarding the main design features, there seems to be substantial scope for calibrating 
the  eligibility  criteria  of  most  guarantee  schemes.    Some  schemes  should  consider 
tightening their eligibility criteria to improve targeting (e.g. reducing the ceiling on firm and 
loan size), while other schemes may need to build an additional margin of flexibility.    
 
                                                           
15 Rocha, Farazi, Khouri, and Pearce (2010).   34 
 
There  is  also  scope  for  calibrating  coverage  ratios  and  fees.    Some  schemes  should 
consider reducing slightly their coverage ratios to levels closer to international standards.  
Most schemes should consider linking both coverage ratios and fees more closely to risk.  
Hybrid payment rules could be tested in some countries, depending on the effectiveness of 
loan  collection  procedures,  but  most  MENA  PCGs  should  probably  avoid  excessively 
demanding payment rules, as this could reduce significantly the attractiveness of the scheme.   
 
In  some  MENA  countries  guarantee  schemes  could  play  a  more  proactive  role  in 
capacity building.  The low share of SME lending in some MENA countries may be due not 
only to weak financial infrastructure but also to weak lending technologies.  In these cases, 
the PCG can play a fundamental role in jumpstarting SME lending while also improving risk 
management practices of domestic banks.  
 
Finally, guarantees schemes should institutionalize a comprehensive review process. In 
order  to  ensure  cost-effectiveness,  MENA  guarantee  scheme  should  conduct  systematic 
assessments of outreach, additionality, and customer satisfaction (bankers and borrowers). 
This  comprehensive  review  should  be  conducted  in  a  regular  basis  using  appropriate 
analytical tools, including an SME survey and a banking survey. One of the best practices to 
consider is  he Comprehensive Review conducted in Canada every five years by the Small 
Business Financing Program (Table 19).   
 
Table 19: Building blocks for a comprehensive review 
Measurement of 
Additionality 
 Measure of the financial and economic impact of the guarantee fund, using 
survey and econometric techniques.  
Cost-benefit analysis 
Comparison  of  all  costs  and  benefits  of  the  guarantee  scheme,  in  order  to 
measure its net social impact.  
Identification of SME 
finance gap 
Identification of the  characteristics of firms that are credit constrained based 
on the business survey and bankers’ feedbacks, in order to readjust eligibility 
criteria 
Assessment of operational 
parameters 
 
Assessment of the key operational parameters on the guarantee scheme, based 
on discussions with stakeholders and using comparisons with international best 
practices. 
Assessment of internal 
processes 
Review of internal processes and systems of the guarantee funds, including 
quality management, operational costs, credit risk management, recovery 
process etc.   
Financial projections 
Simulation of  the need for funding over the medium term, based on 
assumptions on outreach and default rate 
Awareness and customer 
satisfaction 
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Annex 1. Mission Statements of Benchmark PCGs 
  Objectives of the PCG 
Canada 
To help new businesses get started and established firms make improvements and 
expand, to improve access to loans that would not otherwise be available to small 
businesses, to stimulate economic growth and create jobs for Canadians 
Chile  
To guarantee a share of the credits, leasing operations, and other financing 
instruments from public and private financial institutions to eligible micro and small 
enterprises and exporters which do not have guarantees or when these are insufficient 
to secure financing from these institutions.  From 2009, the scheme allows temporary 
access to guarantees to medium and large enterprises.  
Colombia 
To facilitate the financing of micro, small and medium enterprises in Colombia 
through the extension of guarantees.  
France 
To provide assistance and financial support to French SMEs in the most decisive 
phases of their life cycle: start up, innovation, development, business transfer / buy 
out. By sharing the risk, it facilitates the access of SMEs to financing by banking 
partners and equity capital investors. 
Hungary 
To operate as a catalyser in lending to national SMEs and organisations established 
for the accomplishment of employer joint proprietor programs by undertaking 
absolute guarantee, and guarantee for any type of fund involvement: bank guarantee, 
lease and factoring transaction, involvement of venture capital and for EU tenders. 
India 
To improve the availability of bank credit without the hassles of collaterals / third 
party guarantees to support the first generation entrepreneurs to realise their dream of 
setting up a unit of their own Micro and Small Enterprise (MSE) 
Korea 
To lead the balanced development of the national economy by extending credit 
guarantees for the liabilities of promising SMEs which lack tangible collateral. 
Malaysia 
To enhance the viability of SMEs through the provision of products and services at 
competitive terms and, with the highest degree of professionalism, efficiency, and 
effectiveness.  
Netherlands  To stimulate the provision of credit for SMEs. 
Romania 
 To improve SME access to finance by issuing (partial) guarantees for SME loans 
granted by partner banks (or other SME financing institutions). 
Taiwan, China 
To provide credit guarantees to those SMEs that are in normal operation but are short 
of collateral for external financing. The provision of guarantees from SMEG will help 
these enterprises secure financing from financial institutions.  
USA 
To help start-up and existing small businesses obtain financing when they might not 









Annex 2. Mission Statements of MENA PCGs 
  Objectives of the PCG 
Egypt  To promote economic and social development by facilitating access to finance to micro and small 
firms facing a lack of collateral 
Iraq  To   assist small and medium size enterprises in Iraq to gain access to loan finance from Iraqi 
  banks, and to assist banks using the guarantees to develop credible loan administration and risk 
management systems. 
Jordan  1. Guaranteeing SME loans directed towards establishing economic projects or expanding existing 
ones in order to increase production capacity and marketing efficiency as well as create new job 
opportunities and the possibility of earning or saving foreign currencies. 
2. Utilization of guarantees to cover the risks involved in export credit, particularly in those 
industrial sectors, which are in line with the aims of JLGC. 
3. Guaranteeing credit operations in line with the doctrines of the Islamic Law 
Lebanon  Assisting SMEs to access commercial bank funding. Kafalat helps SMEs by providing loan 
guarantees based on business plans / feasibility studies that show the viability of the proposed 
business activity 
Morocco  To stimulate private entrepreneurship by supporting business start-up , expansion and 
modernization.   
Palestine  1. To broaden the credit access in an underserved small and medium enterprises (SME) market 
because of lack or insufficient collateral and to enable SMEs to survive, regain some lost capacity, 
job retention, recreation or creation. 
2.  To  encourage  “Partner  Banks”  to  approach  smaller  companies  at  an  earlier  stage,  or  that 
otherwise could be ruled out from qualifying for credit extension.  
3. To help the Palestinian Monetary Authority revive the economy, generate employment and 
alleviate poverty.  
Saudi 
Arabia 
The Saudi Industrial Development Fund assumes an active role in the fulfillment of the objectives 
and policies of the programs for industrialization of Saudi Arabia. Such a role is carried out 
through provision of financial assistance in form of short-term loans to industrial investment along 
with technical, administrative, financial and marketing advices to borrower enterprises. The 
specialized advice rendered positively contributes to improvement of projects' performance and 
assists them in overcoming the problems they encounter. 
Syria  Initially focusing on the SME sector, LGIS provides credit guarantees for viable businesses that 
cannot provide the level of collateral required by financial institutions. It is intended that the 
activities of the LGIS will contribute to the improvement in the skill base in the financial sector in 
Syria. 
Tunisia  SOTUGAR’s mission is to contribute, in a significant way, to the development of SMEs: 
To facilitate the access of SME to financing, by sharing with financial institutions the risk inherent 
to SME financing 
UAE  The Khalifa fund’s mission is to encourage an entrepreneurial spirit amongst UAE nationals and 
support their enterprise initiatives; to provide financial and business assistance and professional 
expertise to UAE nationals who wish to start their own business; to diversify and increase income 
sources in Abu Dhabi; to establish a solid economic platform and train and prepare UAE 
entrepreneurs to enable them to effectively manage their businesses themselves. 
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Annex 3. Alternative Methods to Assess Additionality 
Methodology  Description 
Interviews  
The most basic way of measuring additionality consists of asking directly guarantee users and 
bankers: “would you have obtained (extended) the loan without using the guarantee scheme?” 
The main advantage of this method is its simplicity. However, answers are highly subjective and 
do not reflect necessarily reality. Users and bankers tend to be overoptimistic about the impact of 
the guarantee.  
Descriptive 
statistics  
A second simple method is based on descriptive statistics. Empirical evidence suggests that some 
types of borrowers are more credit constrained than others, such as small firms, start-ups, firms 
seeking  long  term  finance,  and  firms  with  low  credit  scores.  The  proportion  of  outstanding 
guarantees  allocated  to  those  categories  of  firms  could  be  used  as  a  proxy  for  additionality. 
However, this method does not provide accurate estimates.  
Propensity score 
matching 
This method is based on a survey including 2 groups: a group of guarantee users called “treatment 
group” and a group of firms not using the guarantee called “control group”. The estimation is 
carried out in 2 steps: first, we estimate a lending decision model based on the “control group”. 
This estimation provides the probability for a firm to be credit constrained given its characteristics 
such as size, age, the experience of the manager, the financial structure. Secondly, using the 
parameters of this equation, we estimate the share of firms in the “treatment group” that would 
have been credit constrained without the guarantee. This method is the most used to estimate 
additionality in advanced countries. However, its main pitfall is the problem of self-selection -- 
the fact that firms in the “treatment group” are not fully comparable to firms in the “control 
group”.  Indeed,  there  might  some  unobservable  reasons  for  which  these  firms  apply  for  a 
guarantee, and not the others.  
Encouragement 
design 
This method is based on a survey of 2 groups of firms. A first group, randomly selected, is given 
intensive information about the guarantee. The basic idea is to create a variable (the information 
campaign), that is correlated with receiving the guarantee and it is uncorrelated with any other 
characteristic  of  firms.  When  included  in  a  lending  decision  model,  the  coefficient  of  this 
instrumental variable provides a measure of additionality.  
Regression 
discontinuity  
Many guarantee schemes use credit scoring to allocate guarantees to applicants. The credit score 
has a cut-off point for eligibility. In this method, we should assume that the potential beneficiaries 
of guarantees just above the cut-off point are very similar to the potential beneficiaries just below 
the cut-off point. We can then compare access to credit of firms just above and below the cutoff 
point. One of the drawback of this method is that the number of applications rejected by guarantee 




This method is based on a naturally occurring event that differently affects different groups of 
firms (e.g. change of eligibility criteria, use of guarantees by different banks, at different point of 
time or in different regions). As this natural event is exogenous, guarantees are allocated in a way 
which is not correlated with individual characteristics of firms. In that case, a sample of non-
beneficiaries can be used as a valid control group. 
Randomized 
experiment  
This method selects a control group using a random process: some eligible firms applying for the 
guarantee are randomly rejected. This random process is designed to ensure that the control group 
is similar to the group of guarantee users (the treatment group). Data on access to finance and 
economic  performance  are  collected  from  both  groups  before  and  after  the  intervention.  The 
differences between the two groups reflect the impact of the guarantee. This method is the most 
accurate for assessing the impact of a public intervention. However, it is rarely used to assess 
credit guarantee schemes, because of its high degree of complexity. Moreover, firms that are 
randomly rejected are not fully comparable to firms obtaining a guarantee. Indeed, after being 
rejected, firms might change their behavior and be discouraged from applying again for loans 
(Han et al 2008).  
 